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The Free Trade Negotiations: Canadian and U.S. Perspectives
by Leonard Legault*
Oliver Edwards merits immortality for having said to Samuel Johnson:
"You are a philosopher, Dr. Johnson. I have tried too in my time to
be a philosopher; but, I don't know how, cheerfulness was always breaking in." No apprentice economist could ever make a statement like that!
For my part, I have never tried in my time to be a philosopher or an
economist. As Ambassador of Canada to the United States, I try above
all to be a realist but have never objected to optimism breaking in. And
it is with equal doses of realism and optimism that I want to talk to you
today about the free trade negotiations now under way between Canada
and the United States.
Before I proceed, however, let me say that I am honoured to address
you and that I value highly the contribution your Institute has made to
Canada-U.S. relations. I only regret that the tragic and untimely death
of our Consul General, Syd Harris, deprives us of his presence here, as it
deprives Canada of a great public servant and deprives his many friends
of a relationship that he made very special.
I am not the Canadian negotiator, so I shall not attempt to give you
a progress report or a prognosis with regard to the free trade talks. My
intentions are more modest, but my purpose no less serious for all that.
First, by way of background, I want to tell you something about the
importance of Canada-U.S. trade. Second, I want to give some idea of
Canada's essential objectives in the free trade negotiations, including one
that touches upon the very apt and very timely subject of your conference. Third, I want to give you a Canadian perspective as to what the
United States may stand to gain in the negotiations.
As you know, many people in this country continue to believe that
Japan or Germany or Britain is America's most important trading partner. The fact is, of course, that Canada is America's best customer in the
whole wide world, as America is ours. Japan is not even America's second best customer. Ontario is. This is a message we must deliver over
and over again to our American friends. It is a fact whose significance
for them is almost as great as it is for us, especially in the context of the
free trade negotiations. Unfortunately, it is also a fact which Americans
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tend to overlook and which even Canadians take for granted. Both for
the United States and for us, however, such ignorance or blindness may
carry a price. No other bilateral trading relation anywhere compares
with that of Canada and the United States, in size, in scope, and in
complexity.
Indeed, Canada-U.S. trade surpasses U.S. trade with Japan, Germany, Britain, France, Italy, and almost all the members of the expanded
European Community put together. Yet Canada is a country of only
some 25 million, against 120 million Japanese and over 320 million
Europeans within the twelve member states of the Community. Perhaps
that is why so many Americans have difficulty in recognizing the leading
role that Canada plays in their international trade.
Another common misconception here is that Canada enjoys an inordinate surplus in its trade with the United States. In part this misconception is a result of faulty U.S. statistics (which explains why I will be using
Canadian statistics today). We are getting a handle on the statistical
problem. What is harder to deal with is a certain tendency to look at
trade in goods alone, while ignoring trade in services.
In 1986, Canada had a merchandise trade surplus with the United
States of under 12.1 billion dollars. That in itself is not a large figure,
given the size of our bilateral trade in goods. But, during the same period, the United States ran a surplus of 9.3 billion dollars with Canada in
trade in services (including payments of interest and dividends, as well as
tourism). The real deficit was thus 2.7 billion dollars in Canada's favor.
That represents only a tiny fraction of our total trade in 1986: a rough
balance, in other words.
The substantial U.S. surplus with Canada in respect of services, and
the consequential correction of the imbalance in merchandise trade, is
not a pattern you will see repeated in America's other major trading relationships. With Japan and West Germany, for example, the United
States has a deficit in both the services and merchandise accounts.
So, the popular view of the U.S. trade imbalance with Canada
clearly does not match current realities. Moreover, it also suffers from
an excessively short historical perspective. With the exception of the last
three years, the United States has run an overall surplus with Canada in
every year since the end of World War II. That does not suggest any
structural imbalance.
I shall tell you more about the importance of Canada-U.S. trade
toward the end of this presentation. But let me turn now to Canada's
goals in the free trade negotiations with the United States. The conventional objectives of trade liberalization are the mutual reduction and
elimination of tariffs and the establishment of agreed rules of origin and
improved customs procedures. These objectives indeed figure prominently in the current negotiations between Canada and the United States.
Experience has shown that the world economy has prospered
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through tariff reductions. So has Canada's. In the first forty years after
the establishment of the GATT system, Canada's exports have multiplied ten times and our national wealth has more than tripled. We have
been reducing tariffs for all these years. Now we are seeking to reduce
them to zero in Canada-U.S. trade over a period of perhaps ten or fifteen
years. Seventy percent of Canadian goods already enter the U.S. duty
free, and 70% of U.S. exports to Canada are equally exempt from tariffs.
This does not mean, however, that the elimination of the remaining tariffs would have only a marginal effect on our bilateral trade. As has been
aptly said, trade tends to flow through duty-free holes, and the potential
benefits of further tariff reductions should not be underestimated.
Nonetheless, the more important, and the more difficult, issues in
our bilateral trade are the new ones: non-tariff barriers, trade in services,
investment measures, intellectual property rights, and above all, perhaps,
trade law remedies or contingency protection.
Non-tariff barriers to trade have proliferated in various guises since
the early 1970s. Government procurement practices alone can have an
enormous distorting effect on trade. Thus, we hope to have the United
States drop its "Buy American" policies in exchange for our dropping
similarly preferential policies in Canada.
Trade in services is not yet covered by international rules of general
application. Services are growing more and more important in both the
United States and Canadian economies, and now account for about 67%
of Canada's gross domestic product (GDP). We are pursuing free trade
in services as an objective in the bilateral negotiations as well as in the
GATT.
Intellectual property rights and investment are commonly viewed as
American rather than Canadian concerns. But Canada also has interests
in these areas. We want to ensure our access to new products, services
and ideas, and we do not want patent protection factors to work against
the establishment of new industries in Canada.
As to investment, we have already made clear that we want to attract more capital to Canada, although for the present our negotiators
are discussing trade-related investment measures. The United States, for
its part, wants the talks to embrace investment in general and Canada is
listening.
U.S. trade law remedies-what Canadians refer to as contingency
protection-are especially troublesome for Canada. The protectionism
that was formerly expressed in tariffs has now been translated into such
trade law remedies as antidumping and countervailing duties, emergency
import restrictions, and so-called voluntary export restraints. Some are
unfair trade measures and some are camouflaged as unfair trade measures. Some do not even pretend to this justification.
Between 1980 and 1986, at least twenty-two antidumping investigations, fourteen countervailing duty cases, and six escape clause actions
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have been brought against Canadian exports to the U.S. market. Shakes
and shingles, and softwood lumber are only two of the more publicized
cases. Altogether, U.S. actions have affected about 6.5 billion dollars
worth of Canadian products, and still other products are now under
threat of restriction. The situation is bad, and it could get worse. There
are currently three different draft omnibus trade bills before the Congress-ominous trade bills as I like to call them. Most of the changes
proposed in these bills are intended to afford greater protection to U.S.
producers.
In Canada's view, the only effective solution to the problem of contingency protection or trade law remedies lies within the framework of a
comprehensive agreement. It is only within the structure of a binding
agreement that we can define the "rules of the game" and restore the
predictability and stability that are vital to our trade with the United
States. We have no problem with Americans who cannot accept dumped
or subsidized imports from Canada. We do not want such imports
either. Nor do we want unilateral determinations of what constitutes
dumping and subsidization. What we do want is a clear and unique set
of rules to govern the issues that give rise to trade law remedies, with
subsidies among them. We want these rules to be jointly agreed to. We
want joint determination of what constitutes a breach of the rules. And
we want quick and binding procedures for the settlement of disputes. In
short, we want to create a system of extra-national trade laws to prevent
the politics of protectionism in either country from undoing the integrated market already forged by geography and economics.
Those Canadians who worry about the integration of the Canadian
and U.S. markets are worrying about a fait accompli. Compare North
America and Europe for a moment. Last year about 80% of Canada's
trade was with the United States. By way of contrast, West Germany,
France and the United Kingdom each depended upon the other members
of the European Community for 60% or less of their trade.
In the case of Europe, integration has come about as a matter of
policy. In the case of Canada and the United States, integration has
come about largely as a matter of geography and economics. Ours is a
common law relationship, if you like. Thus, apart from exceptional sectors such as automobiles and defense, Canada-U.S. trade has been
blessed, so to speak, only by the GATT.
The absence of an effective legal framework for this relationship
makes Canada unusually vulnerable. Without a free trade agreement, we
risk being an object of decision-making. With an agreement, we become
a partner in decision-making. Far from losing our identity, we gain an
opportunity to give an agreement a voice. Far from thwarting regional
development, we safeguard our ability to promote it under agreed rules.
So much for Canada's general objectives. But what does the United
States tend to gain from a free trade agreement with Canada? Seen from
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a Canadian perspective, at any rate, the advantages of such an agreement
for the United States would span at least three levels.
First, Canada is far and away America's single best bet in fighting its
way out of its current trade deficit. We are already America's best customer by a long shot, as I noted at the outset. Last year Canada took
nearly a quarter of America's exports. Moreover, compared with
America's other major trading partners, we take a higher proportion of
the value-added merchandise that generates so many jobs in this country.
In 1986, 77% of U.S. exports to Canada were manufactured goods, and
25% of all U.S. exports of manufactured goods went to Canada. Your
merchandise exports to Canada in 1985 equalled the value of U.S. exports to some 150 other countries. Pause for a moment and think of that!
And 41%-almost half-of your surplus on services was earned in Canada. Pause for a moment and think of that, too!
Besides, in contrast with the rest of the world, we keep buying more
from the United States every year. From 1982 to 1985, all U.S. exports
grew by less than one-half of one percent. U.S. exports to Japan grew by
less than 8% and U.S. exports to the European Community actually fell
by 4.5%. During those same three years U.S. exports to Canada grew by
more than 40%. In fact, the growth in U.S. exports to Canada over
those three years is almost twice the value of America's total annual exports to the entire continent of Africa.
The Administration, most of Congress, and U.S. industry all agree
that the way to curb the deficit is by increasing exports. Canada is where
American exports are increasing. Given our record, a free trade arrangement with Canada ought to play a key role in the United States strategy
to bring down the deficit. We are not even a small part of America's
problem, but we are a very large part of the solution.
The second level at which the United States stands to gain from a
comprehensive trade agreement with Canada is in the advancement of
the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN). Canada shares with the
United States a desire to broaden the new MTN round to include agriculture, trade in services, and intellectual property. That desire is not
shared by some of our other trading partners. It was an uphill battle to
get these items on the agenda at Punte del Este. To get them off the
agenda and under the GATT will be harder still. Our bilateral negotiations could be extremely helpful in this regard. While many of the issues
will be similar, the reduction in the number of players should make the
process simpler and faster.
Current estimates for the duration of the Uruguay Round vary from
four to ten years. If the United States and Canada can put together an
agreement in these new areas over the coming months, we can act as
both a catalyst and an example to the rest of the world. But if we fail,
who can hope to succeed?
The third level at which a bilateral trade agreement holds poten-
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tially significant benefits for the United States is a broader one. Canada's
support for U.S. strategic, political and security objectives follows from
our shared values and interests and from our responsibilities as an independent member of the Western Alliance. We do not expect or ask the
United States to pay for our friendship with commercial concessions.
But it is a political fact that relations between states are, in the final analysis, one and indivisible. When almost 80% of Canadian exports go to
the United States, it would be foolhardy for either country to believe that
rocky trade relations would not affect general relations over the long
haul.
Let me emphasize again that ours is by far the world's largest bilateral trading relationship. Given its unique size and complexity, it is remarkable that we have been content until now to leave its regulation
entirely to the GATT and to national laws. Once we look at the facts, it
seems clear that Canada and the United States have a shared interest in
creating a larger North American market within a binding system of
North American rules and institutions. Will Congress see things in this
light if and when it comes to consider a free trade agreement with Canada? Is such an agreement compatible with the omnibus trade bills now
under consideration?
There are signs that the U.S. Congress may proceed more carefully
than last year in approaching the omnibus trade legislation that will inevitably emerge in the coming months. Lest I overdose on optimism, however, let me emphasize that this legislation will probably be bad enough,
even if it may not be quite as bad as the bill passed by the House of
Representatives last year.
Last year's bill was described by many American observers as being
in good part a matter of political posturing. This year's will be for real,
with the Democrats firmly in control in both chambers and in a position
to put together a veto-proof package if they give due heed to the Administration's bottom line. That bottom line, moreover, may be less demanding than in the past.
I think it is safe to say that Canada is not going to like the U.S. trade
law of 1987. But I believe it is also safe to say that it will not herald any
general antipathy to a special comprehensive trade agreement with Canada. Certainly no one in Congress appears to see any inconsistency between neo-protectionist legislation and a bilateral agreement.
For my part, I believe that the agenda and objectives of Canada and
the United States are compatible. Prudence demands an agreement, and
wisdom can fashion one. Canada has long had to live with the reality of
interdependence. That reality is a new one for the United States.
Although this country is still the largest trading nation in the world, its
position in international trade has deteriorated as its dependence on trade
has grown. For both countries the challenge lies in finding a mechanism
for the management of interdependence, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Those who see a dichotomy between sovereignty and interdepen-
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dence must come to accept that any such mechanism, whether bilateral
or multilateral, represents a channel, and not an obstacle, for the exercise
of sovereignty, a source of strength and not a surrender. In other words,
a practical application of the rule of law. Of course, the agreement
should be as broad and as deep as possible. Half heartedness has little
appeal and half-measures give few benefits.
There are also sensitivities on both sides that must be taken into
account. But Canada takes nothing away from the United States in insisting upon its freedom of action to maintain its identity and the social
and cultural programs that contribute to that identity. And the United
States takes nothing away from Canada in insisting upon its freedom of
action to maintain its national security and the variety of programs that
contribute to that security. There will also be adjustments to be made on
both sides. But those adjustments may be much less than the one that
might have to be made without an agreement. And they will bring gains
as well as pains, whereas the adjustments imposed by protectionism
would be all pain and no gain.
No one should be lulled into believing that all pain can be avoided:
the alternative to an agreement is a status quo that has already escaped
us. Nor should anyone fall into the easy belief that disparities of size
necessarily mean undue disparities of advantage under a free trade agreement between Canada and the United States. In a symbiotic relationship, mutual advantage prevails. Certainly both sides must win if the
negotiations are to succeed and the agreement is to gain approval. Certainly both sides will lose if the initiative fails.

